Driving Cyber Security Excellence in e-Government

Protecting Delaware's Citizens and Critical Systems





Agenda

Driving Cybersecurity Excellence in e -Government

Intro and background	5 mins
Risk Landscape into 2024	20 mins
Changing the game with effective mitigation	15 mins
Q&A	5 mins







Intro and background



RedShield is a security service, which finds, fixes and manages web application vulnerabilities

- Fully outsourced web security operations and platform/tooling
- Shields are code objects in a reverse proxy, removing the need to redevelop applications

12.6 billion	Legitimate website transactions secured by RedShield per month
100 trillion	Security inspection point checks performed on website transactions per month - checking for good vs bad
40 million	Malicious hacking attempts blocked in August
>80,000	Website vulnerabilities under management





RedShield includes a cloud platform based on a full proxy architecture in AWS* to guarantee speed and availability

RedShield's proprietary processes (playbooks) and software protects and secures customers' most critical applications





RedShield's approach continues to gain traction with both new enterprise customers and partners.





Risk Landscape into 2024

2024's enemies are gearing up with focus and persistence



2023 has seen Pro Russian hacking groups threatening Ukraine allied nations

- "NoName057" joined Killnet and Anonymous Sudan in attacking government and enterprise websites
- Specifically calling out government organisations publicly supporting Ukraine with sanctions and militiary assistance
- A series of cyber attacks ensued, targeting high profile government and enterprise websites across western nations.
- NoName057 claimed that they had caused disruption to several unprotected websites.





A series of attacks began targeting websites protected by RedShield

Large scale attacks peaked every ~ 24 hours

- Large scale attacks occurred throughout the day and night
- Following a repeated pattern targeting particular sites
- Culminating in a 2.34Tbps monster attack, one of the largest DDoS attacks of 2023 reported globally
- Expect to see attack sizes into 2024 take another jump in size





Normal user load of 100 - 1,000 people using the site







Atypical large "DDoS" attack

- A common DDoS attack would see >100x normal load, equivalent to 100,000 normal users.
- Philadelphia Stadium holds 67,000



Peak load 1,000 people





Colossal attack, equivalent to 343 million simultaneous web visitors

- This attack consumed network bandwidth equivalent to the entire population of the United States all visiting the website at once.
- Identifying and blocking the bad traffic throughout an attack at this scale, whilst providing uninterrupted service to good users, requires a massive globally distributed infrastructure, with autonomous machine-driven defensive controls







Web Applications were the biggest avenue for data breaches in 2022

1.8B _{vs} 27M	With 1.8B websites globally and only 27M developers, it is impractical to apply sufficient resources to resolve all exploitable problems for all applications.
12 months	It typically takes enterprise organizations 12 months to remediate half of their new vulnerabilities
246 days	In 2021, the average time taken by developer teams to fix high severity vulnerabilities
62%	Of all actual breaches now involve web applications





Web application breaches reinforce the need for MFA and vulnerability mitigation

- Threat actors rely on **exploitable flaws** within your applications they can attack from the shadows and do not require social engineering or tricking of your staff.
- They leverage the technical debt that is common in all organizations with the competing resource requirements of innovation, and continuous maintenance of legacy systems







Use of stolen credentials is by far the biggest attack vector for bad actors, offering cost/time efficiency for breaching applications

Other

SQLi



2022 main sources of web app breaches





Login forms are soft targets for stolen credentials and brute force so should be a priority for security teams to protect

What are the problems with login pages?

- Applications using login forms are often vulnerable:
 - Some apps allow weak or dictionary guessable passwords
 - Most apps allow reuse of creds which already appear in stolen password databases
 - MFA is not yet ubiquitous, especially for legacy apps
- Many apps do not prevent excessive / automated login attempts so brute force remains an effective attack vector
- Widespread availability of stolen credentials lists on the internet make exploitation easy and cost effective
- RedShield has observed growing numbers of bots crawling the enterprise perimeter, guessing large numbers of passwords; persisting for months



Russian hosted networks continuously probing for weaknesses

- The operating model is consistent with organised criminal groups
- Example: 193.x.y.z/24 network hosted in central Moscow has a poor reputation
- Continuous vulnerability scanning combined with brute force attempts
- Owned by Hong Kong shell company, registered to an address linked to many others via "Paradise Papers" leak
- Appears to be a Command and Control hosting network. A large number of fake websites, which often move hosting companies, and hostnames changing constantly

organisation:	ORG-CWTC2-RIPE
org-name:	Chang Way Technologies Co. Limited
org-type:	OTHER
address:	7/F, MW Tower, 111 Bonham Strand
address:	Sheung Wan
address:	Hong Kong







Russian hosted networks continuously probing for weaknesses

- Iroko is a hosting and colocation company with abundant links to criminal activities
- 5.45.80.0/24 network hosted in Moscow has a poor reputation spam, web blacklists, anonymizer proxies
- Continuous vulnerability scanning combined with brute force attempts
- Owned by Panama colo company, registered in UK, touting Panama's "strong commitment to privacy"

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Further underlying pressures from other APT groups are implicated in attacks blocked by RedShield

In addition to public claims by NoName057 hacker group, other Advanced Persistent Threat groups are implicated by the characteristics of attacks mitigated by RedShield against government applications:

APT Group	Description	Attribution matching factors
APT41 Wicked Panda	APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as a Chinese state -sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially -motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries.	 Attempts to exploit CVE-2019-3396 Attacks originating from extensive purpose-built infrastructure based in China
CARBANAK	CARBANAK is a cybercriminal group that specializes in financial crimes. They have conducted numerous high-profile attacks on banks and financial institutions, resulting in substantial financial losses.	 Attempts to exploit CVE-2017-5638 This attribution is lower confidence, due to this group historically targeting banks more than government organisations.
MUDDYWATER	MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.[2][3][4][5][6][7][8]	 Attempts to exploit CVE-2019-2725 Known to target government organizations.



Anonymising proxy networks

Massive parallel IPs - residential proxy services

Attackers can rotate through virtually unlimited proxies hosted on unlisted IPs, making traditional defenses much less effective:

- IP based session tracking and rate limiting
- IP reputation and geo blocking
- IP threshold banning





AI Powered CAPTCHA Services are Rapidly Evolving

Al has reduced the cost of CAPTCHA solving for bot herders, improving economies of scale for attackers

- AI-powered CAPTCHA services have automated solutions for most common CAPTCHA services
- Easy and cheap, via API
- Human-powered services fill the gaps with complex/premium CAPTCHA schemes





Phishing kits offer an easy way to bypass some MFA

Non-phishing -resistant MFA is easily bypassed

- Time-based One Time Password apps
- Apps which allow login approval in-app
- SMS and email one-time-passwords

Trivially set up a proxy which is transparent/identical to the victim website except for hostname

https://yourdomain.com.KE6wlBDdSV.co/dxIFrvcK9JslqC





Bot mitigation used to be so simple

- Early bots were standalone scripts that did not process Javascript sent from the server.
- Client side Javascript tests worked to detect a bot vs a real browser.





Bots used to be so simple

- Newer bots are more often scripts that drive a headless browser to evade detection.
- The headless browser has Javascript execution capability and can behave just like any real browser it IS a real browser





Anti -bot defense systems

Anti-bot defenses try to detect bots vs humans:

- Client fingerprinting, human/bot indicators
 - IP reputation, geolocation
 - Client side javascript sensors (indicators of automation frameworks, window size, plugins, mouse movements)
- Behaviour analysis over time
 - Non-human session characteristics URI patterns, tripwires
 - Timing of requests (ML-based)
 - Trending and thresholding (eg failed logins per minute, per IP, per geo, etc)



Anti -bot defense systems have serious challenges

All of the 'sensor' information is under the control of the adversary and should not be trusted.

- Indicators of real human activity can be spoofed
- Indicators of automation frameworks can be hidden

CAPTCHAs are facing serious challenges from AI and human-driven solving services

False positives are typically not tolerated by the business. AI approaches to mitigation must be extremely accurate.

The effort of defining, implementing, configuring, tuning and maintaining countermeasures should not be underestimated.

https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/Automated-threat-handbook.pdf



Anti -bot defense systems have serious challenges

RedShield engineers performed testing of automated login processes against login pages

- Three target websites mix of production (online banking) and test sites
- Three leading*cloud WAF and anti-automation vendors
- Anti-bot feature sets enabled and tuned according to vendor recommendations

Goals:

- Test automated logins using a dictionary of credentials
- Observe any differences in detection techniques, and their effectiveness



Anti -bot defense systems have serious challenges

Configuration of some bot mitigation strategies caused excessive false positives, and in all cases had limited tuning options and visibility

• eg, Advanced behavioural detection

For successful automated logins, randomised mouse move calls and randomised wait times were all that was required (minimal expertise).





Bots are increasingly human -identical

- Detecting the difference between an unknown human user, and a bot impersonating a human, is becoming impossible
- For this reason, security policy makers and insurance providers are increasingly mandating the use of MFA for all applications which handle personal information.
- In practise, this includes many existing and legacy applications
- Integrating MFA into the login flow for web applications can be a major burden on over-busy developer teams





Changing the game with effective mitigation

Exploring the challenges and emerging solutions for mitigating risk



CISA cannot put it more strongly: MFA is a critical priority

As the Nation's Cyber Defense Agency, CISA sees how our nation's adversaries operate and what tools they use.

While some of these adversaries use advanced tools and techniques, most take advantage of **unpatched vulnerabilities**, poor cyber hygiene or the **failure of organizations to implement critical technologies like MFA**.

Sadly, too few organizations learn how valuable MFA is until they experience a breach.

Jen Easterly, Director, US Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)





FIDO2 is ideal for critical accounts, but has some limitations

- Hardware tokens are strong and very difficult to clone, but have drawbacks:
 - Logistics
 - User/key lifecycle management can weaken security, reliant on email and helpdesk
 - o Cost
- **Passkeys** are very promising for devices that the user exclusively controls
 - Not suitable for public library or shared computers
 - Can present challenges for marginalized communities and the general public





Email "Magic Link" Solves Many of these Issues

"Magic link" provides a non-guessable link via email, to open a new session

- Works well as additional factor, to augment existing password authentication in legacy apps
- Password delete takes additional setup
- Security of email is foundational to this scheme
 - Note: in practical use, email security is foundational to most authentication, even
 FIDO2 - because of enrollment processes and password/MFA reset via email and/or support tickets.





RedShield's No Touch MFA reduces the risk of a breach due to compromised accounts without relying on constrained resources

Let RedShield implement and manage MFA and SSO for legacy web applications; leaving your developers free to focus

RedShield's No Touch MFA service includes options for:

- TOTP, SMS and email, Phishing Resistant Magic Link
- Integration with Sendgrid, Twilio, Duo
- Logging integration with common SIEM platforms
- Standard and customised email and login form templates
- SSO integration with Okta and Entra ID (Azure AD)
- Hardening application session tokens and authorization vulnerabilities
- IP reputation, geolocation and email domain restrictions

Without changing your application code, secure your login pages to reduce the risk of these account takeovers.



With RedShield we were able to implement MFA in days. This was for both new and legacy applications and all without having to divert valuable development team resource.

Tier 1 Australian Telecommunications provider



RedShield's No Touch MFA operates on full proxy architecture in global data centres to mitigate DDoS, ensure speed & availability



RedShield's No Touch MFA can flexibly use a range of methods to:

- determine the username & generate authorisation tokens
- engage directly with standard company resources to send the message via email, SMS or TOTP
- validate the authorization token
- handle exceptions
- generate appropriate assurance logs

All that is required is a simple DNS change

Also mitigates CVEs and penetration test findings

No Code. No Resources. No Touch





MFA rollout for the resource -strapped CISO

MFA and SSO for legacy apps addresses the practical challenges

- Excluded content and IPs
- Unusual authn schemes
- Javascript and redirects
- Multi stage form posts
- Password reset schemes
- Single page apps and server-server APIs with token auth schemes
- Device trust workflows, step up authentication and risk-based policies

Whilst avoiding:

- Requirement for code changes and software re-engineering
- Cost of hardware and software tokens, and third party smart device apps
- Logistics of enrollment helpdesk and excessive customer communications overheads during rollout







Link to Slides and FREE Attack Surface Risk Report



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